ON THE AUTOMATICITY OF AMERICAN NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY
In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a fl ag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the fl ag hanging unnoticed on the public building. (Billig, 1995, p. 8) The results of a massive Zogby poll on the views of American voters in the months before the 2004 presidential election were summarized in a report entitled "E Pluribus Duo: Red State versus Blue State America" (Zogby, 2004) . The play on the American national motto of "E Pluribus Unum" ( From Many, One ) refl ects the theme evident throughout the polling results, which is that Americans showed remarkable divergence in their opinions on issues related to war, religion, the economy, and many others, according to whether they identifi ed as Republican or Democrat. This political divide continues today, in the lead-up to the 2008 presidential election, with Democrats and Republicans disagreeing strongly on the same basic issues. For example, whereas 77% of Republicans said they thought the Iraq Surge was making the situation better, only 28% of Democrats thought so according to a recent Gallup Poll (Saad, 2008) . Another recent Gallup poll found that whereas the majority of Republicans (60%) believe that humans were created in their present form by God 10,000 years ago, only 38% of Democrats agreed (Newport, 2008) . And, whereas nearly three-quarters of Republicans (72%) said they approve of the job President Bush is doing, only 9% of democrats said so, according to a Gallup poll ( Jones, 2008) . These polling numbers, and others like them, would seem to suggest that political expression and behavior in the United States is determined largely by party-based ideologies, an impression that is supported by decades of research on the predictive validity of party identifi cation for voting behavior (e.g., Bartels, 2000; Bassili, 1995; Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Cohen, 2003; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Green, 1988; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002; Miller & Schanks, 1996; Petrocik, 1989) .
If party affi liation is the ideological engine that drives much political behavior in the United States, it is notable that it is often understood as a consciously accessible and intentional infl uence. People can report it easily (e.g., Green et al., 2002; Miller & Shanks, 1996) , and intentionally base their political decisions on it (e.g., Bassili, 1995; Cohen, 2003) . At fi rst glance, this would seem to imply that much political expression and behavior proceeds in a conscious and intentional manner. And yet, there is also a rapidly growing literature on how choice and behavior can also proceed automatically (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005; Zaller, 1992) . This literature would predict that, whereas people might consciously behave in line with their explicitly avowed political ideologies and values, they may also be unintentionally and nonconsciously moved by subtle political and ideological cues in their environment. This possibility would indicate that people might answer polling questions, or make voting decisions, in line with ideological cues of which they are unaware, and by which they would prefer to remain uninfl uenced (Wilson & Brekke, 1994) .
In the current chapter, we fi rst consider research and theory that suggests how ideological knowledge might infl uence people in an automatic fashion and then discuss how nationalist ideologies in particular might operate implicitly. We then review recent fi ndings concerning American nationalist ideology and consider directions for future research. Kay & Jost et al., 2007 ; see also Devos & Banaji, 2005) . These researchers have argued that people possess ideologies that (implicitly) justify the economic, cultural, and social systems of society, even at the expense of personal or group interests. Such an ideology, for example, leads to disadvantaged members of society holding the very stereotypes and beliefs about their group that would seem to perpetuate their marginality. Those classifi ed in the lower strata of personal income may be especially likely to react to an instance of injustice (and thus, a perceived threat to the legitimacy of the system) by implicitly activating a stereotype that mollifi es or invalidates that injustice. For instance, when such people hear about the fact that 1% of people in the United States possess more than 38% of the wealth in this country (Wolff, 2000) , they may implicitly generate the stereotype of "poor but happy, rich but miserable" and thereby feel less threatened by their "econom ically poor" but "psychologically rich" situation (see Kay & Jost, 2003) . This work suggests that the perception of an injustice might automatically activate a principle or axiom that mitigates that injustice. We seek to expand on this work by investigating other kinds of implicit ideological effects, and we describe this approach below.
IDEOLOGY FROM A SOCIAL COGNITIVE STANDPOINT
How might ideological knowledge exert its infl uence in an implicit manner? Research in social and cognitive psychology over the last two decades demonstrates that a range of information is typically associated in memory with a given stimulus and can become activated on the mere perception of that stimulus (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hassin et al., 2005) . For instance, people possess associations in memory between group members and attitudes, stereotypes, behaviors, and goals related to that group. This body of work implies that a range of cues in our environment, such as political icons and symbols, might be associated with various types of ideological knowledge and information. These types of information would likely be diverse, and could include values, principles, exemplars, beliefs, expectations, behaviors, emotions, and motives (e.g., Carlston & Smith, 1996; Smith & Queller, 2001) . Furthermore, the perception of one element of that array of knowledge should serve to activate the other elements, even without the person's awareness or intention (e.g., Devine, 1989) . This then suggests that the (conscious or nonconscious) perception of any of the cues interconnected with such ideological information should inevitably activate that information.
What happens once such a potentially rich array of information has been unknowingly and unintentionally activated in memory? Research suggests that this activated information can then infl uence not only the specifi c stimuli to which the perceiver then attends, but also the ways in which the perceiver will interpret and react to subsequently encountered stimuli more generally (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007) . For example, the subliminal perception of a member of a stereotyped group can activate in memory specifi c trait information, which can then infl uence how the perceiver interprets the ambiguous behaviors of an interaction partner (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Higgins, 1996) . In a similar way, the perception of nationalistic symbols or icons, such as the American fl ag, would be expected to activate associated attitudes, beliefs, goals, and behaviors, which would then have the potential to implicitly infl uence one's subsequent thought and behavior.
It is important to note that the kinds of information that can become associated with political icons do not necessarily have to be endorsed by the perceiver. A long history of psychological research suggests that people spontaneously, easily, and sometimes nonconsciously learn about the covariation among stimuli. For example, research on implicit learning suggests that people can encode sophisticated and complex relations among nonsense stimuli according to an artifi cial grammar, even while remaining consciously unaware of such learning (e.g., Anderson, 1983 Anderson, , 1996 Howard & Howard, 1992; Kelly, 2003; Reber, 1993; Seger, 1994) . The notion of unintentional learning also manifests in social psychological work on stereotypes and prejudice. Through a variety of channels, people unknowingly learn about various beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors in relation to certain groups. And, importantly, even though people can actively disagree with such implicit associations, the associations can nevertheless infl uence both subtle and overt behavior toward group members (e.g., for reviews see Bargh, 2007; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hassin et al., 2005) . The fact that implicit attitudes, beliefs, goals, and behaviors can be dissociated from intentional ones more generally suggests that people may also possess implicit ideological knowledge with which they would explicitly disagree. One guiding objective of our research on this topic is to examine the existence and scope of this kind of dissociation. We now turn to more specifi c questions about the characterization, content, and operation of nationalist ideology. We also discuss whether and why knowledge that becomes associated with nationalist symbols would tend to be ideological in nature-that is, supportive of the respective systems.
Although nationalist ideologies have been defi ned in myriad ways across disciplines and scholars (e.g., Billig, 1995; Breuilly, 1992; Gellner, 1983; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Skitka, 2005; van Dijk, 2005) , we view a nationalistic ideology as consisting of beliefs, attitudes, goals, and behaviors that together prescribe certain economic, political, and social systems for a particular nation. That is, a nationalistic ideology consists of the constructs that characterize a particular nation, distinguish it from others, and support its continued existence. For example, nationalistic ideology might consist of information that supports a given nation's existing form of government (e.g., democracy, dictatorship), economic system (e.g., capitalism, socialism), and various social institutions (e.g., marriage, education, religion, family). It should be noted that we are therefore not limiting our examination of nationalist ideology to citizens' expressed positive attitudes toward, and commitment to, their nation, as has been the case with previous research on "nationalism" in particular (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Skitka, 2005) . Instead, we consider a range of constructs that are implicitly associated with one's nation, which can include both positive attitudes toward the nation as well as the variety of constructs mentioned previously. It is for this reason that we refer throughout this chapter to "nationalist ideology" rather than "nationalism."
It is perhaps worth reiterating that we do not characterize as implicit nationalist ideology anything that is implicitly associated in memory with the nation. Instead, in line with the defi nition of ideology we described earlier, we only consider as nationalist ideology those memories associated with the nation that are supportive of or consistent with current, national systems. This would include memories that could conceivably endorse and preserve the institutions, programs, policies, and perspectives of the respective nation. This distinction means, for example, that we would not consider the memories underlying the colors red, white, and blue to be by themselves ideological in nature, even though they are surely closely associated in memory with the American fl ag. However, any memories that are consistent with key American foreign or domestic policy (e.g., aggression) or values would qualify as ideological. Moreover, any information that increases regard for such policies or values would also be considered ideological. For instance, we discuss in the section on recent empirical work the prediction that the perception of U.S. cues implicitly evokes greater positive regard and endorsement for the materialistic values and behaviors theorized to be an inherent component of capitalistic/market-based systems (e.g., see Kasser, Ryan, Coucheman, & Sheldon, 2003) .
Although we are therefore making a distinction between ideological and nonideological nation-associated knowledge (i.e., prescriptive versus nonprescriptive), we should emphasize that the information that people tend to learn about the nation is not randomly generated. The sources of much of the information that gets disseminated about the nation within the respective populace should by and large consist of national systems (e.g., media, government, corporations). As such, the nation-related information that is widely dispersed within a citizenry can, on some level, be expected to be largely supportive of the systems of that respective nation (e.g., see Herman & Chomsky, 1988) .
We should also note that while there presumably is a great deal of unanimity across citizens (at least within stable nation-states) with regard to their attitudes toward broad governmental and economic systems (e.g., capitalism, materialism), people should nevertheless vary in the degree of their support for both broad principles, as well as more specifi c political stances, positions, and current events. What would predict or explain such differences in nationalistic ideological knowledge of citizens of the United States?
Although we have tested for multiple moderators, as we discuss throughout the empirical section below, the moderator that has so far proven important in explaining the variance in the results is the participants' reported exposure to American political news. Why would news exposure matter? We argue that the primary source of information about the nation (in the case of the United States) is the national news media. People acquire information about the country through news programs on television, magazines, radio programs, and the Internet. Whereas some people follow political news about the nation closely, such as news concerning the war in Iraq and the war on terror, for example, others are less politically engaged and watch the news only rarely, if at all. In this way, the information that becomes associated with the United States, and in turn with national cues, should be affected to some extent by whether people pay attention to current events and national politics. We discuss this moderator in more detail in the empirical section below, as well as in the discussion section.
Empirical Evidence for Implicit American Nationalist Ideology
How do nationalistic ideologies become activated? Ideological knowledge concerning one's nation is typically explicitly measured. For example, researchers might ask respondents to indicate their support of various governmental or economic systems, or the degree to which they value the nation, on Likert-type scales (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) . Instead of asking people to knowingly and intentionally provide their opinions and attitudes concerning the nation, however, we are interested in those types of knowledge and information that are associated with the nation in memory and that can become implicitly activated in memory on the perception of nationalistic stimuli. Thus, for our main experimental paradigm, we use symbols of the nation (e.g., the national fl ag) as primes, and then test the types of knowledge and information that become activated and infl uential on subsequent attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. In most of the research reported here, we used one of the most ubiquitous national cues in the United States-the national fl ag. Although the fl ag has been a highly visible national symbol since the founding of the country, its presence has greatly increased since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September of 2001 (Gerstenfeld, 2002; Kellner, 2003) . The pervasive presence of the fl ag in the lives of Americans enhances the ecological validity of any fi ndings that emerge. In the research we summarize here, we examined three constructs-power, materialism, and aggression. More specifi cally, in each of the experiments we describe here, we subtly primed participants with either the American fl ag or a control stimulus, then measured their responses in terms of one of these three constructs. In each section, we review our predictions and then the fi ndings. First, however, we briefl y discuss political news exposure as a moderator.
News Exposure
Does reported exposure to the news actually predict knowledge about current events? To the extent that people report following U.S. political news, we expected them to possess more knowledge about current political events, as well as political knowledge in general, compared with those who say that they rarely follow the news. In one study that took place in July of 2005 (see Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) , participants were fi rst asked to report the extent to which they followed U.S. political news on average, according to a 10-point scale. To validate this item, we also asked them to provide details about their weekly intake of news from a range of sources including television news programs (e.g., CNN, The Daily Show , network news programs), newspapers (e.g., The New York Times ), and news websites. They were also asked a number of other questions such as their grade point average (GPA) and political affi liation.
Participants then were asked to indicate their knowledge of current events and political facts. For example, they were asked to answer questions about a variety of current events, such as the announcement of the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Conner, a recent insurgency attack in Iraq, and the coverage surrounding the leak concerning CIA operative Valerie Plame. Participants were also asked to answer questions that assessed their knowledge of people in key political positions. For example, participants were asked to identify the governor of their home state, the Secretary of State, and the people commonly referred to by the press as "Neo-Cons."
What News Exposure Is Not . We assessed whether reported news exposure, according to the one item, correlated with potentially confounding variables. News exposure was not correlated with political affi liation or party, GPA, gender, non-news TV watching, or type of news source (conservative versus liberal). We have replicated the lack of relationship between news exposure and these and other constructs (e.g., math SAT, religiosity, verbal SAT) across multiple studies (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2006a; Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2006b; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) .
What News Exposure Is . As expected, reported news exposure according to the one item was correlated with watching a variety of news programs (FOX, CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, The Daily Show ) and reading a national newspaper ( The New York Times ). Also, importantly, it signifi cantly predicted participants' knowledge of current events and also political facts. In fact, those high in news exposure (according to a median split) correctly answered more than double the number of questions about current events compared with those low in news exposure, as one would expect.
These results indicate that reported news exposure, according to the single item described earlier, refl ects the degree to which participants know about current events and political fi gures. The results also suggest that those with high media exposure may be exposed to information about national topics mainly through TV news, but also to some extent through newspaper and website reading. We now turn to research examining the construct of power in implicit American nationalism.
Power
America is regarded as the closest thing to a superpower remaining in the new multipolar world (e.g., see Von Drehle, 2006). Its military might and global economic force are respected and feared the world over (e.g., see Young, 2000; BBC News, 2006) . One of the most familiar symbols of this power is the American fl ag, which is fi rmly affi xed to every military aircraft and tank, and fl ies high over the offi ces of America's most powerful corporations. The most powerful men and women in America are its politicians, who are most commonly seen by the general public behind podiums draped in the stars and stripes, wearing fl ag lapel pins and brilliant red or blue ties on crisp white shirts. All of these images collude to associate America (and, by extension, the American fl ag) with the concepts of power. We thus predicted that the perception of American cues would lead to an increased desire for power.
The fi rst study was designed to examine the impact of the presence of the American fl ag on the accessibility of the concept of power (Carter et al., 2006a) . Based on the idea that people associate the American fl ag with powerful positions and politicians, we predicted that, when primed with the fl ag, participants would show an increased accessibility of the concept of power. For the dependent measure of accessibility of power, we used a word fragment task, in which participants fi lled in the missing letters to a number of word fragments that could be completed with either a power-related or -unrelated word. We also expected that this effect might be moderated by individuals' political news exposure. After all, a major source of information about the military, economic, and cultural power of America over other countries is the American news. Thus, we predicted that the association would be strongest in those individuals who reported high exposure to political news, whereas those individuals low in news exposure would show a weaker association.
For this fi rst study, we brought participants into the laboratory, ostensibly to perform an experiment on the relationship between visual acuity and individual differences in abstract thinking. Upon arriving in the laboratory, participants fi rst completed a questionnaire on their political ideology and news following habits. Next, participants performed a computer-based priming measure, which they were told was the "visual acuity task." It actually contained subliminal fl ashes of either the American fl ag or a control fi gure immediately before the target stimuli to which participants were responding. The target stimuli were images containing either curved or straight lines, and participants were asked to determine, as quickly as possible, whether the lines were curved or straight. The subliminal exposure to the American fl ag ensures that any effects of the American fl ag would be implicit. Participants then completed the word fragment task. The measure consisted of 12 words, each with some letters missing, and participants were told to fi ll in the missing letters to form complete words. Six of these word fragments could either be fi lled in to form a word related to power (e.g., power, leader, boss) or a word unrelated to power. The other six words were fi ller words.
We found that participants who had been subliminally primed with the American fl ag fi lled in signifi cantly more of the word fragments with words related to power-but only if they followed U.S. political news. Participants who reported low news exposure were equally likely to fi ll in power and nonpower words. Thus, as predicted, the subliminal perception of the American fl ag activates the concept of power, and this activation is moderated by news exposure (Carter et al., 2006a) .
The fi rst study demonstrated an implicit association between America and the concept of power for news follower, but we were also interested in determining whether this would lead to a greater desire for power. To examine this possibility, a second study was designed to examine the impact of the presence of the American fl ag on the desire for powerful roles. We predicted that, when primed with the fl ag, participants would show an increased desire for power. For the dependent measure of a desire for power, we used a questionnaire developed by Smith and Trope (2006) , in which participants express a preference for more or less powerful roles in a series of vignettes. Similar to the previous experiment, we believe this effect may be moderated by the extent to which individuals expose themselves to political news.
Participants were approached on campus to complete a packet of ostensibly unrelated surveys in exchange for a candy bar. The survey packet contained the political ideology and news following habits questionnaire, a priming measure, and a measure of desire for power and a suspicion probe. The priming measure was a "Visual Geography Quiz" that asked participants to identify four locations from black and white photographs and indicate their confi dence in that identifi cation. Two of the pictures included an image of the American fl ag, although for half of the participants, those same pictures had the fl ags digitally removed. The measure of desire for power describes three scenarios, each with two different roles (Smith & Trope, 2007) . One role in each scenario had relatively high power, and one had relatively low power. For example, one scenario described two roles in a construction company. Employees (the low-power role) would be responsible for construction/architecture tasks and interior design tasks. Supervisors (the highpower role) would be responsible for selecting employees, assigning them tasks, and evaluating their performance. Participants were asked to rate each role for its desirability, then choose which role they would prefer in that scenario, using a fi ve-point scale.
Finally, participants responded to a suspicion probe, which asked them about the strategies they had used during the Visual Geography Quiz, and whether or not they had noticed anything odd about the surveys. No participant mentioned anything about the presence of the American fl ag in any of their responses. Thus, we can presume that any infl uence the fl ag may have had on participants was unnoticed and unintended, and therefore implicit.
We found that participants who were primed with the American fl ag rated the more powerful roles as signifi cantly more desirable than the less powerful roles, and also tended to choose the more powerful roles than participants in the control condition, although again, only for those who followed U.S. political news. Participants low in news following showed no difference in their desire for a more or less powerful role between the fl ag and control conditions. Thus, a subtle exposure to the American fl ag implicitly increases the desire for powerful positions, and this was again moderated by news exposure. We should add that the participants' explicitly expressed political ideology and party affi liation did not have any moderating What are the implications of an association between America and the construct of power? It could imply that people might attempt to assert their power or authority in a nationalistic context, thus escalating a delicate situation. Would a union negotiator in the presence of the American fl ag be less likely to reach an important compromise if her concessions threatened her authority? Would a voter choose a candidate based on the candidate's explicit expressions of power, rather than on his explicit expressions of policy? Although the current studies examined the accessibility of, and desire for, power, we are currently examining whether the perception to American cues leads to behavioral effects in line with a desire for power.
We will also examine the potential boundaries of this association between the nation and power. For example, would news-watching participants primed with American cues show negative or socially undesirable expressions of power, such as making a weaker individual suffer? The highand low-power roles in the study just described were all in relatively benign contexts, and this raises the question of whether the effect would extend to more important or less socially acceptable contexts. Moreover, we also will examine whether the implicit association just demonstrated represents a uniquely implicit association, or whether people maintain similar explicit associations. That is, whether a dissociation exists between implicit and explicit associations of America and the concept of power.
Another question for future research concerns the moderating effect of news exposure on the association between America and power. Namely, is the effect due to self-selection or learning (or some combination)? The fi rst possibility is that those who possess a strong association in memory between America and power also happen to follow the news more so than those who do not possess that association. This would mean that the moderator of news exposure is merely incidental. Or, it could be the case that those who tend to follow the news eventually learn the association between America and power, and this would mean that the content of the news is a causal factor in this story. It could also be the case that both are true to some degree. Although people who possess the American-power link may for whatever reasons tend to follow the news, that association should eventually become strengthened from the exposure to repeated pairings in the news between American images and expressions of power (see discussion in Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) . Future research employing a direct manipulation of news exposure will be one way to distinguish these possibilities. We now move on to fi ndings concerning implicit effects of American symbols on materialism, a concept certainly related to power, in that they are both concerned with status. 
Materialism
One way in which America exerts its power is through its vast economic might. As the world's wealthiest country, with the largest share of the wealthiest 10% of citizens (Davies, Sandstrom, Shorrocks, & Wolff, 2006) , the buying power of Americans is at an all-time high. Furthermore, behavior and values related to the consumption of goods remain an integral part of American culture. For example, in recent research (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000) , participants under mortality salience found money and material goods more attractive, and also acted more greedily in a shared resource game than control subjects. In a review of related research, Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, and Sheldon (2004) concluded that this is in part because participants under mortality salience cling to their worldview to escape thoughts of death, and materialism is part of the dominant cultural worldview (see also Kasser & Kanner, 2004 , Schor, 1998 .
The predominant role of materialism in American culture is also sometimes made explicit by national leaders. For instance, President Bush said the following at a press conference, shortly after the tragedy on September 11th, 2001:
We cannot let the terrorists achieve the objective of frightening our nation to the point where we don't conduct business, where people don't shop . . . Mrs. Bush and I want to encourage Americans to go out shopping. (Bush 2006) Given this kind of explicit link between the nation, patriotism, and shopping, it may be that such values and behaviors become activated implicitly on the mere perception of American cues. It should also be the case that news exposure moderates the association between the nation and materialism. Those who closely follow the news may be the most likely to have internalized the connection President Bush made explicit in the speech cited above, and thus directly associate participating in the economy as an act of nationalism. Moreover, one of the major sources of information about America's wealth and concerns with money is the national news. Thus, we predicted that a desire for wealth and spending would become associated with America more closely for those who are high in news exposure, whereas those low in news exposure would be less likely to have this association.
Based on the idea that people associate America with wealth and consumerism, we predicted that participants covertly primed with the American fl ag would place a higher importance on material values. For the dependent measure of materialism, we asked participants to rate the importance of various factors they might consider when looking for a new job. This allows participants to place more or less importance on money and status without violating social desirability norms.
Participants were approached on campus to complete several unrelated surveys in exchange for a candy bar. The packet contained a questionnaire on news following and political ideology, the fl ag priming task (the "Visual Geography Quiz" described earlier), the materialism measure, some fi ller questionnaires unrelated to the present prediction, and fi nally, a suspicion probe. For the dependent measure of materialism, we asked participants to imagine they were looking for a new job and to rate eight different job attributes for how important each would be for their decision. Four of the eight job attributes were pretested to be associated with materialism (salary, possibilities for a raise in salary, prestige of job title, having subordinates to supervise). The other four attributes were pretested to be unrelated to materialism, and served as control items (intellectually stimulating, fl exible hours, friendly atmosphere/co-workers, opportunity to work with people). A composite rating of the materialistic attributes was created, as well as a difference score subtracting the nonmaterialistic attributes from the materialistic attributes, which served as a measure of the comparative importance of the materialistic attributes.
In the suspicion probe, no participant mentioned anything about the presence of the American fl ag in any of their responses. Thus, we can presume that any infl uence the fl ag had on participants was unintentional. We found that, compared with participants in the control condition, participants who were primed with the American fl ag rated the materialistic attributes signifi cantly higher, but only if they reported high news exposure. Similarly, participants primed with the American fl ag had a signifi cantly higher difference score (indicating a greater relative weighting of the materialistic over the nonmaterialistic attributes) than participants in the control condition, but again, only if they were high in news following. Participants low in news following showed no difference on these two measures. Thus, as predicted, the subtle and covert exposure to the American fl ag implicitly led participants to express more materialistic values, and this effect was moderated by news exposure (Carter et al., 2006b) . Also, as found in the power studies, the participants' explicitly expressed political ideology did not moderate the effect, and controlling for it statistically did not alter the moderating role of news exposure.
These fi ndings fi rst suggest that expressions of value can be infl uenced by the covert perception of nationalistic cues. This could infl uence various types of decisions, particularly those that concern money. For example, a person making a purchase decision might be persuaded to choose the more luxurious option if its packaging contains a subtle reminder of America, even when the person does not have the money to do so. It may also be the case that people who are making decisions about national policies and programs Another issue is the potential distinction between acquiring money and spending it. That is, do such nationalistic cues lead participants to place a greater value on money, leading to a hoarding instinct, or does the acquisition of money merely represent the ability to spend it conspicuously? Does it lead to a greater value of money only because it means the ability to spend it immediately? If the association is indeed about spending money, is it about spending more generally, or is it limited to more conspicuous expressions of wealth? We are investigating all of these possibilities currently. Furthermore, we are also investigating whether the moderating role of news exposure is due to self-selection factors or learning, as discussed in the previous section on power. We now turn to the last group of empirical fi ndings concerning the implicit effects of American cues on aggression.
Aggression
Beyond the notions of power and materialism being implicitly associated with America, we have also tested for the possibility that the construct of aggression is linked with the nation in memory and is able to become activated on the perception of subtle nationalistic cues (Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) . The theme of aggression is prevalent within public discourse on American current events (e.g., Von Zielbauer & Marshall, 2006; El-Naggar, 2006; Kocieniewski, Dewan, Hamill, & Gately, 2006) , in terms of America aggressing on others (e.g., in Iraq, Afghanistan), other groups or entities aggressing on America (e.g., terrorists), and Americans showing aggression toward each other (e.g., school shootings). The association between American cues and war might be particularly strong currently, given the ongoing war between the United States (and other countries) and Iraq, as well as the well-publicized "war on terror" initiated by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September, 2001.
Furthermore, America has a reputation as a violent society. The violent homicide rate in America dwarfs that of other industrialized nations (United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, 2002), and we are still plagued by school shootings and other violent crime. This violence seems to be part of American culture. For example, violence in America (and especially the prevalence of guns in America) is one of the central themes of Michael Moore's 2003 Oscar winning fi lm "Bowling for Columbine." Also, interestingly, immediately before major and minor sporting events, many of them violent and aggressive in nature, Americans stand and salute the fl ag while singing the national anthem in a striking display of national unity. Together, these examples suggest that simply perceiving a symbol of the nation may be suffi cient to activate aggression-related knowledge in memory, with potential downstream effects on behavior.
Should such an association emerge for everyone? Just as the variable of news exposure moderates the implicit effects of national symbols on power and materialism, we also expected that it would do the same for aggression. As before, the main argument here is that the news provides a constant stream of details about America and aggression across a variety of domains and events (for reviews, see Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Bushman & Cantor, 2003) . This should mean that those who report high news exposure should possess stronger links between the nation and aggression compared with those who report little or no news exposure.
In the fi rst of three experiments (Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) , participants were covertly primed with the American fl ag as they walked into the lab room. Specifi cally, they signed in to a "participant log" sheet, and a nearby text was either face-up, showing a color image of the American fl ag, or was face-down, with no fl ag or American images visible. Thus, the image of the American fl ag was present in the room in a highly naturalistic manner, in a way that likely mimics everyday exposure to nationalistic images in the real world. After signing in, participants then sat at nearby desks and completed a series of word fragments, as well as other fi ller questionnaires. Among the word fragments were ones that measured aggression ("hi_" and "gu_") and war ("wa_"). Participants then eventually reported their news exposure, among other demographic information.
None of the participants reported noticing anything about the fl ag, even when told that a political cue had been placed in the room. The results showed that, for those who reported high news exposure, those primed with the fl ag were signifi cantly more likely to complete the word fragments with the aggression and war words, compared with those not primed with the fl ag. This effect was absent for those low in news exposure. This fi rst experiment demonstrated that, for those who follow the news, the covert perception of a nationalistic cue made aggression and war more accessible in memory than for those not exposed to such a cue. We should also note that the interaction between news exposure and priming condition was not moderated by party affi liation, suggesting that this effect emerged for Democrats and Republicans alike, as long as they watched the news.
What might be the downstream affects of such accessibility? We tested this in the next two experiments. In the fi rst, participants completed a scrambled sentence task (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979) in which American cues were placed (e.g., America, nation, fl ag ) alongside many nationalist-unrelated words. After completing this task, they were then asked to read a vignette about a target who was acting in an ambiguously aggressive manner (Srull & Wyer, 1979) , and asked to rate the target on a series of personality traits that were either directly or evaluatively consistent with the construct of aggression. After this task and some fi ller questionnaires, they then reported their news exposure habits, as well as other demographic information.
None of the participants reported noticing any connection between the scrambled sentence task and the vignette task. There was only the expected interaction between news exposure and priming condition, which was not moderated by participants' political party affi liation. The results showed that, for those who reported high news exposure, those primed with the fl ag rated the target as signifi cantly more aggressive than those not primed, on both the aggressive-related traits and the traits evaluatively consistent with aggression. This effect was absent for those low in news exposure.
In the next experiment, we sought to test for potential behavioral effects. Participants fi rst began a computer task in which they had to decide whether an array of dots was odd or even (Bargh et al., 1996) . In between the displays of the dots, an American fl ag or a control image was subliminally presented. After about 80 trials, an error message appeared on the screen, and the experimenter then informed the participant that the computer had not saved the data and that the participant would need to do the dot task a second time. This mild provocation has been used in previous research by Bargh and colleagues (Bargh et al., 1996) . A hidden video camera recorded each participant's reactions to the news, then two independent judges coded each participant for the extent to which he responded with aggressiveness. Participants also completed a mood measure, then fi lled out a number of questionnaires, including one about their news exposure habits. They then were told that they would not have to do the task a second time, and were thanked and dismissed.
As expected, the results showed an interaction between priming and news exposure. (There was no effect of party affi liation on the results.) For those high in news exposure, those primed with the fl ag were rated as relatively more hostile than those not primed. As was found in the studies reported earlier, this effect was not evident for those low in news exposure. Thus, this pattern of data suggests that the perception of American cues automatically increases one's tendency to respond to a mild provocation with relatively more aggression, as long as one is high in news exposure. Moreover, there were no effects on participants' mood, suggesting that even though they were acting in a relatively more aggressive fashion, they remained consciously unaware of it. Together, these three experiments on the implicit link between America and aggression showed effects on construct accessibility, judgment, and behavior (Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) .
These fi ndings suggest that the covert perception of American cues might be able to infl uence how (news-watching) Americans disambiguate their world. A phrase or statement or action that might otherwise seem neutral might be interpreted as more aggressive if it is perceived within a subtle nationalistic context. But, importantly, is the nation linked with aggression generally? Or, is it the case that news-watchers who encounter nationalistic cues are more likely to see aggression in potential threats to the nation, or enemies, or foreigners in particular? Such an effect would show the selectivity of the kinds of knowledge implicitly linked with America. In current research, we are examining whether this is the case. Moreover, we are also exploring the extent to which people are aware of this kind of effect, and whether they would knowingly act in such a way.
Finally, it should be noted, as was the case with power and materialism, that people with high news exposure may have stronger associations between aggression and America for a couple of reasons. First, it may be the case that those who follow American news learn these kinds of associations, and, in this way, the news can be thought of as a source for this aspect of implicit American nationalism. However, it is also possible that those who are particularly concerned with the role of America in aggressive pursuits might be particularly interested in watching the news, and, in this way, the moderating role of news exposure would be due to self-selection factors. And, of course, these two explanations are not mutually exclusive.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we considered a social cognitive approach to implicit ideology. Based on theory and research in social cognition showing how thought and behavior can occur nonconsciously and unintentionally (Bargh, 2007; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Greenwald & Banaji, 2005; Hassin et al., 2005; Wilson & Brekke, 1994) , and theory across the social sciences concerning the possibility that ideological knowledge operates "below the radar" (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Althusser, 1994; Bem & Bem, 1970; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Brewer, 1979; Freeden, 2000; Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994, p . 999), we described some ways in which ideological knowledge might be able to become activated in memory implicitly, and then infl uence the person's attitudes, judgment, and behavior without his knowledge, intention, or awareness.
Against this general background of how ideologies might operate implicitly overall, we considered nationalistic ideologies in particular. We proposed 3070-161-1pass-003-r02.indd 70 3070-161-1pass-003-r02.indd 70 9/15/2008 1:32:13 PM 9/15/2008 a defi nition of implicit nationalist ideology and discussed the case of American ideology. Specifi cally, we summarized recent fi ndings showing that the types of nationalistic knowledge that become activated on perception of American cues depend on the person's level of political news exposure. For news-watchers, the perception of such cues leads to more support for power (Carter et al., 2006a) and materialism (Carter et al., 2006b ) and more evidence of aggressive judgment and behavior (Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) . Next, we discuss some implications of these fi ndings.
Relation to Other Research on Implicit American Ideology
Whereas the present fi ndings speak to the potentially implicit effects of ideological symbols in general, they focus on the effects of American cues specifi cally. In this way, the results expand on the work by Devos and Banaji (2005) showing the implicit association between the American identity and White ethnicity. These researchers found an interesting dissociation between the extent to which participants consciously rated groups and ethnicities as "American" and whether they actually possessed implicit associations between national symbols and those same groups. Even though participants occasionally reported that non-White ethnic minorities were more American than Whites, their implicit associations showed the reverse pattern. Such a dissociation has meaningful implications for behavior, as implicit associations are likely to guide interpretations, attitudes, and behavior in spontaneous, or cognitively busy, situations (e.g., see Fazio & Olson, 2003) . Interestingly, Butz, Plant, and Doerr (2007) found that American fl ag primes activated egalitarian attitudes and decreased hostility toward Arabs for those participants high in nationalism. These fi ndings would seem on some level to be at odds with the Devos and Banaji (2005) fi ndings, as well as with the studies reported earlier, showing an increase in aggressive behavior for news followers primed with the fl ag (Ferguson & Hassin, 2007) . However, it should be noted that a considerable amount of psychological research shows that highly familiar stimuli (such as ethnic groups or cultural icons) are associated with diverse arrays of memories, some of them contradictory in nature (e.g., people holding both prejudice as well as egalitarianism toward a group). The kinds of memories that become activated depend on both situational as well as personal variables. It is our contention that national symbols are similarly complicated and likely will elicit very different kinds of effects depending on the circumstances. Future research can continue to identify and document such effects and the moderators that matter for them.
The present pattern of results is consistent with recent work on how system justifying ideologies exert their infl uence implicitly (e.g., Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay & Jost et al., 2007) . Jost and colleagues have argued that people possess ideologies that serve to strengthen the legitimacy of cultural, social, and economic systems. When people encounter an instance of injustice that might threaten the legitimacy of the system, they spontaneously generate stereotypes and beliefs that mollify that injustice and restore legitimacy to the system(s). People are unlikely to be aware that their interpretation and reaction to an injustice is guided by a collection of such stereotypes and beliefs, and this implies that ideological knowledge can operate without awareness or intention. In a similar way, the current work demonstrates that political expression and behavior can be unknowingly guided by an ideology that is temporarily activated by a mere situational cue.
Jost and colleagues have argued that certain ideologies ultimately increase support for the status quo (e.g., Jost, 2006; Kay & Jost et al., 2007) , and the present fi ndings can be tentatively interpreted from this perspective. This research demonstrates how everyday, subtle reminders of America can activate knowledge and information that would seem consistent with current and predominant American policies (aggression, power), and economic systems (materialism). Once activated, this information infl uences judgments and behavior in ways that bolster the American nationalist ideological system, thus increasing the desire for power, material status, and displays of aggression. Even though these associations and behaviors may not be explicitly endorsed by the participants as consistent with their personal view of what America should be, we argue that any behavior expressing a sentiment consistent with American nationalist ideology helps to support the system. Thus, the infl uence of American symbols in the studies we report earlier is not merely an expression of implicit ideological knowledge, but an implicit expression of American nationalist ideology.
One critical question that remains, however, is whether these effects are due to the present government and administration, or are more chronic, and perhaps orthogonal to the temporary political constituency of the government. Moreover, the effects of American cues on power, materialism, and aggression emerged most strongly for news watchers. One possible interpretation of the effect of this moderator is that the (mainstream) media ultimately propagate support for some of the policies of the status quo (e.g., Alterman, 2003; Bagdikian, 2004; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; cf. Kuypers, 2002; McGowan, 2002) , a conclusion that is speculative and warrants further research.
The Development of Ideological Knowledge
Another interesting question for work in this area is how different ideologies might develop (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) . Some ideologies may be actively and intentionally learned initially, then eventually operate effi ciently in the background, thus providing a nonconscious context for more deliberate and conscious thinking, in much the same way as a skill becomes automatized (e.g., Smith & Lerner, 1986) . For example, someone who begins to identify with the Democratic party may initially think through the positions and stances quite carefully; eventually, however, those positions and principles may automatically infl uence that person's interpretation of subsequent, even ambiguous, political events and statements (Cohen, 2003) .
Other ideologies, on the other hand, may develop in a more passive manner. For instance, one possibility in the current research is that people who follow the news unknowingly absorb associations between the nation (and national symbols) and various values and principles. People may be unaware that such ideological knowledge becomes attached to the fl ag, or any political cue, and thus may not feel the need to monitor the infl uence of that cue during political expression and behavior. This suggests that the nature of the development of ideological knowledge might infl uence the ease with which one might become aware of, and thus potentially control, the infl uence of that knowledge on thought and behavior (see also Wilson & Brekke, 1994) .
Political Party Affi liation and Implicit American Nationalist Ideology
These fi ndings together suggest that, although decades of research show that party affi liation guides much political behavior (e.g., Bartels, 2000; Bassili, 1995; Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Campbell et al., 1960; Cohen, 2003; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Green, 1988; Green et al., 2002; Miller & Schanks, 1996) , it apparently does not determine whether power, materialism, and aggression become automatically activated on the perception of the American fl ag, at least according to these initial studies. This suggests a potential disconnect between people's explicit thoughts, feelings, and behaviors concerning national matters, and their implicit responses. Whereas people's political party affi liation strongly predicts many aspects of their explicit nationalism, as described at the outset of the chapter, it does not seem to predict at least some elements of implicit nationalist ideology. Future research can further explore the scope and extent of this kind of dissociation.
It is important to note that these results clearly represent only the initial examination of implicit American nationalist ideology, and it may be the case that party affi liation does matter for particular attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. For instance, whereas it may not moderate the link between the nation and power, materialism, and aggression, it may moderate the association between the nation and the support for some policies and principles. The infl uence of party affi liation might also be diminished within politically homogenous samples. Namely, it may be the case that party affi liation would moderate some of the effects if we tested them with a more politically diverse sample. Given that college students in the United States often affi liate more strongly with the Democratic than Republican party (and this was true in each of our experiments described earlier), it is necessary to examine more conservative-leaning samples in order to explore more fully the infl uence of party affi liation.
News Exposure and Implicit American Nationalist Ideology
In addition to investigating whether news-watchers develop their unique set of associations with the nation as a function of watching the news (versus because of other individual differences), it also seems critical to examine the specifi c types of news that people follow. One noteworthy aspect of the current research is that few people closely followed clearly conservative news sources, such as FOX news. (The vast majority of participants reported following CNN and the major network news programs.) It would therefore be informative to sample participants who vary more widely on party affi liation as well as the types of news they follow. One pertinent question would be whether the current effects are pronounced for those who follow conservative news sources, and whether the effects are mitigated for those who follow exclusively progressive news sources (e.g., National Public Radio). Another question would be whether some associations exist that all Americans would have, regardless of news exposure. That is, everyone who grows up in America might learn to associate some specifi c concept with American nationalist ideology. Although this is an intriguing possibility, the current results suggest that what we would consider to be some of the basic tenets of American culture (power and capitalism) were, in fact moderated by news following. Future research will bear this out.
Generality of the American Findings
Regardless of the causal direction of news following as a moderating variable, we believe that the infl uence of the primes in our studies is based on the activation of implicit knowledge of American nationalist ideologies. As such, we would expect that the expression of these implicit associations would have little to do with being American per se, but rather a function one's knowledge of American nationalist ideology. Thus, just as liberals and conservatives did not differ in the way that they were infl uenced by the fl ag prime in the studies reported earlier, we would expect that non-Americans who have a fi rm understanding of American nationalist ideology would show the same types of effects that Americans do. The associations that develop would likely be somewhat culturally dependent, as the information would be fi ltered through each individual culture. For example, when the source of American nationalist knowledge is highly skewed, as is often the case in state-controlled media markets such as China or Iran, the implicit associations (and thus the effects of an American nationalist prime on attitudes and behavior) would refl ect that skewed information. Citizens of countries whose information about America is primarily concerned with its military actions abroad would perhaps show even stronger associations with power and aggression than would Americans, who may have a more extensive set of associations than non-Americans. Similarly, the infl uence of other countries' national symbols on Americans would be a function of Americans' knowledge of the ideologies of the other countries, and directly related to how strongly the symbol is associated with that knowledge.
The causal direction of news following as a moderator is important in determining whether it would generalize as a moderator to other countries. If news exposure is the primary source of American nationalist ideological information, then we would expect it to be an important factor in non-American samples as well. If, on the other hand, news exposure is a moderator as a proxy for some other individual difference, then the infl uence of American nationalist symbols on non-Americans would be somewhat unpredictable, and likely subject to different and unique moderators in each different culture.
Examining Other Nationalist Ideologies
We have also recently conducted a series of experiments on the nationalist ideology of Israel. In this research, we focused on examining the effects of the subliminal presentation of the national fl ag on political attitudes and behavior, rather than on general constructs such as aggression and power. We assumed that the Israeli fl ag in particular represents mainstream Zionism. We also assumed that, given that fl ags are often used to express unity and patriotism (Skitka, 2005) , the mere perception of such fl ags may implicitly elicit unity (Billig, 1995; Firth, 1973) . On the basis of these two premises, we hypothesized that Israeli participants who are subliminally primed with the Israeli fl ag should express more mainstream Zionism or, in other words, should become more moderate in their political attitudes and judgments.
As reported in a recent empirical paper (Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovsky, & Gross, in press) , this was indeed the case. That is, after having been primed, both liberals and conservatives became more moderate across a range of national policy issues. Most strikingly, the subliminal priming also infl uenced participants' intentions to vote, as well as their actual voting behavior, in the Israeli national election (held on March, 2006). To our knowledge, this is the fi rst evidence of a subliminal priming effect on voting behavior.
Coda
In his work on banal nationalism, Billig (1995) suggested that mere environmental stimuli-such as national fl ags-activate and maintain the ideology of nationalism. Billig not only accepted the idea that ideologies work like habits, but explicitly stated that (a) they may operate nonconsciously and (b) that many "innocuous" stimuli, such as a fl ag on a public library, are crucial for the maintenance and pursuit of a national ideology. The current research is an attempt to begin empirically testing these propositions, and the fi ndings thus far suggest that ideological knowledge can be activated quite subtly, and serve as an invisible lens through which the person views and interacts with the world.
